ABSTRACT Th e Columbia Basin Project (CBP) is the largest comprehensive reclamation project in the United States. An intertwined system of water diversion, capture, storage, movement, and use for hydroelectric production and irrigation, made famous by the capstone of Grand Coulee Dam, the CBP completely transformed the arid environment of central Washington and the economy of the Pacifi c Northwest (PNW). As this project stretches now into 75 years of plans, actions, reactions, and potential future actions, there is a surprisingly small amount of literature examining this project and its far-reaching implications. Originally planned as a reclamation project, the CBP morphed over time as values and priorities changed; never achieving completion, approximately two-thirds of the original planned project acreage is currently irrigated, but with escalating ecologic and economic implications. Th e most obvious ecologic implication has fi xated debates about development in the Pacifi c Northwest, and that is the near annihilation of historic salmon runs due to dam construction. As this question (salmon versus dams) consumes most scholarly literature related to the CBP, we chose instead to examine everything except ecologic implications. Th is article reviews the existing literature on the CBP from several fi elds, noting that many economic, social, legal, policy, and agricultural questions remain unanswered aft er 75 years. Th ose unanswered questions become particularly important in light of recent discussions within Washington State concerning completing the CBP, thus potentially increasing the size of irrigated lands by one-third in the Columbia Basin Project.
Introduction
In the Pacific Northwest, there appear to be two major religions: irrigation and salmon. Historic anadromous fi sh runs of legendary proportions supported a rich variety of Native tribal economies for centuries in this region of sharp geographic contrasts. Several species of salmon started life in icy mountain streams high in the Columbia River watershed, migrated down to the Pacifi c Ocean, then late in life made their heroic return upstream against the currents to their waters of origin to spawn and die. Salmon provided the major food supply, basis for a trade economy, and spiritual soul of the Northwestern identity. People, like salmon, followed the fl ows of the river, migrated with seasons, and lived in cycles of lean and fat times. But white settlement, followed by urbanized coastal growth, and massive alterations of the region's primary hydrologic resource, the Columbia River, have remade this landscape into a radically diff erent vision of what nature can provide. In the past century, irrigation agriculture expanded with religious fervor across a huge swath of the Pacifi c Northwest. Building the infrastructure of irrigation agriculture consumed the focus of much intellectual energy, political wrangling, and economic subsidization. Irrigation took on biblical proportions and came with the deep spiritual belief that this region's lands needed to be tamed, the unruly and wild Columbia River needed to be subdued, and nature's potential could not be reached without "reclaiming" the land from its original unacceptable condition. Now the Columbia River is the most dammed river system in the world, with 75 major dams (14 along its mainstem). Among those dams is the infrastructure for the largest reclamation project in America, the Columbia Basin Project (CBP), which has become a desert agrarian empire, made possible by the slack water held behind dams in storage for irrigation (Getches 1996) . As this project stretches into 75 years of plans, actions, reactions, and potential future actions, there is a surprisingly small amount of literature examining this massive project and its far-reaching implications. Originally designed as a reclamation project of 1.1 million irrigated acres of agriculture, the project never achieved completion. Today, approximately two-thirds of the original planned project acreage is irrigated, but with escalating ecologic and economic implications, as more water than the entire annual fl ow of the Colorado River is poured onto the Columbia Plateau each year. Because the existence of dams on the Columbia River decimated salmon runs, tensions between supporters of salmon and supporters of irrigation delineate the topographic lines of social stress in the region, with polarizing views on both sides. Moreover, because several salmonid species now have the dubious distinction of being listed as endangered species, the subjects of salmon, riverine ecology, ecological impacts of dams, hydropower generation, and habitat restoration dominate both the politics of the region and the academic literature related to the Columbia River.
Perceiving what seem to be unanswered questions and a lack of critical analysis of the CBP itself, we undertook a survey of the scholarly literature on the CBP covering the period from the end of the fi rst development of the project to the present. Th e search for literature focused on identifying the availability of published information to a skilled researcher without a specialization in the topic, identifying topics that would be available to anyone who is familiar with literature indexes and knows how to conduct a search, but does not necessarily have any specifi c domain knowledge. Any eff ects of the CBP on fi sh and wildlife, river ecology, biology, and hydropower are well represented in the literature. Th us, the search and its results were limited to published scholarly literature in non-ecological realms, including the fi elds of agriculture, agricultural economics, environmental history, geography, political science, and legal review. Of particular interest to the authors was fi nding the presence or absence of literature addressing the winners and losers of the CBP, consistencies and contradictions in the motivation and execution of the project, and evaluations of the project's success.
Geographic Setting
Th e Columbia River, the fourth largest in North America, extends more than 1,210 miles as it wends a fast-moving but circuitous path from its headwaters in the Canadian province of British Columbia, down to the point at which it dumps into the Pacifi c Ocean. Headed essentially south through the state of Washington, albeit with severe turns and directional twists, the river then heads west through the Columbia Gorge, where a deep notch cuts across the rising Cascade Mountain Range. Here, the Columbia River serves both as the political boundary between the states of Washington and Oregon and as a water route from the interior to the ocean. With a total catchment that begins in British Columbia and encompasses 260,000 square miles in parts of Washington, Montana, Idaho, and Oregon, this massive river drains an area larger than France (Corps 1958) . Th e largest topographic features, which confi ne the watershed basin, are the outer spurs of the Rocky Mountains to the east and the Cascade Range to the west, with a vast, arid, treeless expanse in between. Looking from north to south, the Okanagan Highlands of British Columbia give way to the Columbia Plateau, which itself fades into desert near the south end of Washington near the Oregon border. Th e defi ning characteristic of the hydro-climatic regime in the Columbia Basin lies in the cycle of heavy mountain snow pack and spring melt that provide almost all the water, as this river meanders through a basin region that receives a scant 6 to 10 inches of rainfall annually. Th us, the Columbia River holds practically talismanic signifi cance for irrigators in the Columbia Basin, most of whom would not be able to farm without the Columbia River and its water.
A complex tectonic and glacial history created the raw ingredients needed for fertile soil, which went unused by agriculture for millennia due to the extremely dry climate. Oozing basalt fl ows laid down minerals for millions of years all across the Columbia region; later, glacial action pulverized and scoured off the top of the landscape in the upper Columbia basin (Unnamed 1924) . Glacial fl oods then deposited this on the Columbia Plateau. Pepper in wind-swept ash from Cascade volcanic eruptions and windblown fl ood deposits to this rich loess deposit, and all the ingredients for fertile soil exist, except water. Early Euro-American irrigators did establish small-scale operations prior to the Columbia Basin Project, but not until the federal government provided the massive infusion of capital and vision for structural and social engineering was this scarred and weathered region able to support the intensive irrigation agriculture that now exists.
Columbia Basin Project
Th e CBP, usually mentioned synonymously with the capstone components of Grand Coulee Dam (GCD) and Roosevelt Lake, actually consists of several dams, reservoirs, and canals. A total of 331 miles of main canals carry water siphoned off the Columbia River, stored in reservoirs, pumped and diverted onward via 1,339 miles of lateral canals; this massive diversion sprinkles the high desert with enough water to create an agricultural empire based in central and eastern Washington State (Ortolono 2000) . Currently just over 670,000 acres of land receive irrigation waters from the CBP, with nearly 1,100,000 acres classifi ed as irrigable within the boundaries of the CBP.
Literature Survey
Early irrigation schemes within the rain shadow of the Cascades fl oundered, and farmers in this region without irrigation oft en failed in the early pioneer days, near the turn of the 20th century (Macinko 1961) . Th e need for predictable water supplies for farmers coalesced in localized gravity-fed irrigation systems; but at any larger scale, the cost of such infrastructure required the kind of investment that only the federal government could provide. However, federal money would bring federal control and/or federal visions of what the result should be for this region (Macinko 1963; Pitzer 1991) . With considerable pressure from local boosters, Congressional interest in the Columbia Basin took hold aft er the Corps of Engineers produced the "308 Report" for the Columbia River (Unnamed 1924; USACE 1933) , and the Bureau of Reclamation (hereaft er Bureau) also produced a plan for reclamation through regional irrigation. Th e Bureau report detailed potential for development of the Columbia River, with original suggestions that included a series of six dams on the mainstem of the river, and irrigation to be subsidized via profi ts from the sale of hydroelectricity generated by the Grand Coulee Dam. Interestingly, the Corps report also detailed potential for development of the Columbia River but recommended against building the Grand Coulee Dam, due to a lack of market for either the massive amounts of electricity the dam would generate or the food that irrigation would produce (USACE 1933) .
During the 1920s, and under the Hoover administration until 1932, the primary focus of federal money in the West came in the form of reclamation projects, but even by the standards of reclamation, the Columbia Basin Project was the mother lode of all projects. A complex series of dams would have to be constructed, then hydroelectricity generated, and eventually in the future, irrigation developed. Th e only fi scal logic was that irrigation infrastructural costs were far too much for farmers to aff ord; therefore, hydroelectricity sales would be used to subsidize water delivery to farmers, who would eventually repay the initial cost of construction of the dams but with no interest accrued. In a grand but convoluted scheme of total regional development, the federal government loaned irrigation farmers the capital needed to "reclaim" the vast inland desert of eastern Washington, via construction of dams (the largest of which being Grand Coulee Dam) that would generate hydroelectric power, the profi ts from which would subsidize the cost of providing irrigation water to be stored behind the dam.
As so oft en happens, though, political winds change, and so it was with the transition of presidential administrations from Hoover to Roosevelt. When Franklin Roosevelt came to offi ce, he had bigger headaches than providing water to the unpopulated outback region of the West. Roosevelt explicitly pressed plans for the CBP to the front of his agenda, but as a makework project that would both employ people and provide a translocation scheme for refugees from the dustbowl-ravaged Midwestern states (Egan 2006) . Th us, the CBP transformed into a social engineering extravaganza far beyond just a structural engineering, regional development, or hydrologic project intended to provide land and water so that farmers could settle in the semi-arid region of Washington and farm on small landholdings.
Aft er World War II, the CBP suff ered setbacks, and the immense planning phase stretched on. Water fi nally arrived to irrigators from 1948 to 1952, but costs continued to escalate as more elements of this massive hydrologic re-plumbing project came online. National political and economic realities had changed over the decades. FDR's original vision of small family farms, guaranteed success by government-subsidized irrigation waters, went by the wayside as population redistribution fell out of favor and small family farm plots went fi rst to larger-scale plots and soon thereaft er to corporate agribusiness operations (Brooks 1957; Macinko 1961 Macinko , 1975 . By the 1970s, times had changed again and environmental legislation passed during the height of the environmental era would provide new headaches for the developers of the CBP. In the past few decades, the project has remained mostly static in size, never fi nished, but with 670,000 acres connected into the irrigation system. Now this entire project is undergoing scrutiny once again as new problems with groundwater depletion, due to non-CBP farmers using well pumps for irrigation, have spurred a reopening of discussions about the CBP and investigations as to the feasibility of developing the remaining one-third of original CBP lands by siphoning off more surface water from the Columbia River.
Motivation and Execution
Th e origins of the CBP began with a desire by local citizens to provide irrigation water for farming, but this quickly expanded as the CBP joined larger social and political trends of the Depression and New Deal eras. Regional planning hit its stride in the 1920s, and many considered the CBP to be the height of elegance and planned perfection, what historian Richard Lowitt called the "Planned Promise Land" (Rowley 2002) . Th is is a term heavily laden with biblical hints at salvation and bounty in perpetuity; similarly, this particular ideal of nature was also reminiscent of Smythe and Newlands, two early architects of irrigation in the West (Rowley 2002; Egan 2006 ). Steiner discusses the social vision of the New Deal in relationship to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the CBP, among other examples of regional planning (Steiner 1983 ). Irish (2001) sought to examine the large and complex struggle in both Washingtons, not to mention the United States as a whole, over public power and private enterprise as competitive philosophies for establishing the credibility of the United States economy during the decades before and aft er the 1930s. Pointing out the contentious debate about the value of Grand Coulee in the national arena, Irish also showed how regional infi ghting detracted even further from the potential of the CBP as a fi nancial scheme (Irish 2001) . Oregon power alliances backed the plan to build Bonneville Dam on the lower Columbia and much closer to the urban coastal region. Th erefore, when this dam project gained Congressional approval before Grand Coulee, the CBP appeared to be a house of cards built on the pipe dream of selling power to urban areas that would no longer be in the market for electricity if they relied on hydropower from Bonneville. But the dogged and persistent eff orts of a few people in Washington State, along with Clarence Dill, one of Washington's senators, kept Grand Coulee on the table. Dill had the ear of FDR and pressed the case forward when the tide apparently turned against the likelihood of building the Grand Coulee Dam-and with it, a public water works project so massive that it remains today the nation's largest single source of hydroelectricity (Irish 2001) .
Even beyond the larger battle of public versus private development, elements within the federal government that all favored federal control of natural resources over private-sector development maintained a debilitating sibling rivalry as they vied for supremacy in implantation of federal plans. Before water actually fl owed to irrigators, Bessey optimistically predicted a hybrid version of the Tennessee Valley Authority that would have centralized control, thus theoretically coordinating interagency activities and smoothing over the multiple layers of bureaucratic jurisdiction, all busily working to develop the resources of the Columbia Basin Project (Bessey 1951) . Instead, this rivalry, famously outlined for water resources in the West in general by Reisner (1984) , remained true to form in the Pacifi c Northwest as both the Bureau and the Department of Agriculture set their sights on the CBP. Both agencies essentially agreed that small family farms should be the prime benefi ciaries of the CBP; however, each agency wished to be the primary administrative agent of the program and pressed their own plan for doing so (Utter 2002) . Th e rivalry became so paralyzing that it ultimately created such a power vacuum that both agencies failed to achieve their goals, and larger private interests prevailed in the end, as Utter notes in her detailed look at the fi ght for control of the family farms in the CBP (Utter 2002) .
Without any cohesive plan to ensure the originally envisioned settlement pattern of small family farms, larger, more-corporate interests became the real benefi ciaries of the CBP.
Th is reality would merely confi rm the worst fears of Whittlesey and others, who recognize that on the continuum of government spending for regional development, extreme circumstances could precipitate results exactly opposite to the original intentions. Using the CBP as a case in point, Whittlesey (1995) points out how things can go awry. Th e primary justifi cation for federal investment in planning and constructing public water projects in the West stems from the belief that private development has no incentive to consider larger economic, cultural, or social advantages to projects that may not be strictly profi table in the beginning. Th erefore, some projects are beyond the scope of private enterprise. To this end, the federal government historically invested vast sums of money via agencies such as the Bureau and the Corps of Engineers in water projects in the West, assuming a larger social payoff for that investment. However, when taxpayer money funds defi cit spending in which the country at large holds the burden of investment, but a small group of private interests becomes a direct benefi ciary, public water projects implicitly subsidize special interests at the expense of everyone else. Many see the CBP as a prime example of federal money subsidizing irrigators in the West by funding irrigation that would never be economically viable under other circumstances (Craig 1974; Infanger 1974; Reisner 1984; McCarl 1985; English 1990; Whittlesey 1995; Shepherd 2002 ).
Winners and Losers
Th e original vision-thousands of small, family-owned, family-operated farms, dotting the verdant (irrigated) landscape of eastern Washington-did not evolve exactly as expected (Brooks 1957; Macinko 1961) . However, the question remains as to whether enough other sectors of society did reap benefi ts that the CBP is successful with regard to the larger regional or social economy. Moreover, by what criteria should success be measured? One must also ask, within any set of criteria, what trade-off s must be made with regard to the consequences of the CBP in the determination of any success or lack thereof. It would appear that measures of success and criteria of analysis change over time as values and priorities shift .
Miller attempts to measure some of the regional and national changes in economy resulting from irrigation of the Columbia Basin; he used estimated costs of the CBP compared with agricultural revenues, county tax revenues, retail tax base increase at the state level and within the Basin, and overall income levels, between 1948 and 1957 (Miller 1965) . For social change, he considered population increases and net migration estimates as well as spatial distribution of towns and practical constraints to rural population growth. Miller noted that the growth in rural population was less than expected, but he attributed this to social factors related to agricultural and transportation habits and the large farm size (Miller 1965) . Th e author concluded that, looking only at costs versus repayments, it is obvious that the CBP was a complete failure. However, he also concluded that indirect monetary and non-monetary benefi ts such as population increase, business establishment, investments, and industrial development justify the project. Ten years later, Craig et al. applied the economic tool of fi scal incidence analysis to the CBP in order to assess the performance of publicly provided irrigation as a method of income redistribution (Craig 1974) . Th e authors concluded that economic redistribution provided by public irrigation clearly did not favor those on the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder, and impacts of individual economic redistribution were skewed (Craig 1974) .
Janeway outlined the costs and benefi ts of the project as distributed to individuals and the government, and then examined the diff ering viewpoints of environmentalists, irrigators, and the Bureau (Janeway 1985) . Other scholars outside the U.S. used the CBP in comparative analyses of both international water schemes and regional planning eff orts. For example, Dufournaud noted that mutual benefi ts provide the most common criteria for success on cooperative international water management schemes, but that in the case of the U.S. and Canada with regard to the Columbia River, this logic does not hold true. With riparian parties unequally fi nancially committed, and with benefi ts accruing unevenly to riparian parties, usually one party would opt out of an imbalanced cooperative scheme; Canada, however, continued to cooperate with the U.S. even as escalating impacts of the CBP continue (Dufournaud 1982) . He also found this to be true on the Lower Mekong, utilizing game theory models, and concluded that mutual benefi t is not always a determinant criterion for success of international water management (Dufournaud 1982) . Hall et al. explored concepts of landscape design and land use planning via a comparative study of two large reclamation projects, the CBP in the U.S. and the IJsselmeerpolders in the Netherlands. Analysis of the policies, goals, planning processes, and the extent to which a regional planning framework was used formed the basis of their interest, which considered ecological and political context as well (Hall 1989) .
Butcher et al. explored two case studies within the Columbia Basin, fi rst on a major tributary of the Columbia, the Snake River, and then on the CBP, to compare the economic trade-off s in the competition between irrigation and hydropower using the same water resource (Butcher 1986) . At the time of these case studies, 500,000 acres, or roughly half of the CBP, were irrigated, and the other half had yet to be developed, amid growing debate as to how bringing the other half of the CBP under irrigated cultivation would impact the price of electricity in the region. Th e authors suggested that the CBP illustrated a basic confl ict between state and federal control of water allocation and called for agency reform that would disentangle the rights of irrigation and hydropower, correct interstate externalities, and facilitate interstate water rights transfers if greater effi ciency was to be gained in water use in the Northwest (Butcher 1986 ).
Consequences
Th e fi rst and most visually apparent consequence of the CBP is the total transformation of the region's built environment. Entire generations of citizens in the Pacifi c Northwest have no memory nor concept of the natural landscape or hydrologic fl ow regime of the Columbia River, but they do see the second consequence, the regional growth and development centered on the CBP. Certain groups clearly benefi t more than others do, but overall economic benefi ts for the region are undisputed. Th e ecological and environmental degradation is the third obvious consequence, but that discussion moves beyond the scope of this article.
Some unintended consequences of the CBP, or at least consequences intended but to a diff erent order of magnitude, arose in the disposal of agricultural runoff . When a region with 6 to 10 inches of annual rainfall receives 40 to 50 inches of excess irrigation water, that water must go somewhere. While excess water disposal did fi gure in to the original reclamation plan, that plan clearly did not suffi ciently address the problems. As early as 10 years aft er water began to fl ow into the fi elds, Neff pointed to geologic and engineering diffi culties that excess groundwater recharge in the CBP area created, and he outlined some potential pragmatic solutions (Neff 1968) . Th is is no small matter, as during 1990 in the Pacifi c Northwest, irrigation uses diverted 35.6 million acre-feet of water, but consumptive use by crops accounted for only 36% (or 13.1 million acre-feet) of this total (Russell 1997 ).
In her article on wasted water, Russell also outlines diff erences in water law, implementation, and monitoring protocols (or lack thereof) for each of the Columbia Basin states, which only add to the confusion (Russell 1997) . She also delineates several ineffi ciencies in the capture and delivery of water: none of the Columbia Basin states have clearly defi ned what constitutes wasteful water use; the states generally do not monitor water use or actively look for cases of waste; and signifi cant amounts of water are lost via conveyance, return fl ows, and farming practices (Russell 1997) .
Th ese issues cut to the heart of Western water law and tradition. At the beginning of the CBP in the 1930s, both water-use values and water law evolved out of practical necessity. In the years since this project began, many rounds of legal debate centered on prior appropriation as a system of water law, the defi nitions of benefi cial use, waste, and equity. Scholars attempted to clarify gaps in Western water law, and in some cases acknowledge these gaps as complicit in perpetuating water-use ineffi ciency in the West (Benson 1996 (Benson , 1998 (Benson , 2005 Blumm 1996; Getches 1996 Getches , 2004 Russell 1997) . A lack of clear understanding on several key legal points continues to haunt Western water laws and their implementation. Which water rights are actually usufructory (use only) rights rather than ownership? How can the legal system address changing meanings in the term "benefi cial use" over time? What role should/does increased effi ciency have in reallocation of water rights as increasing water demands press current users? What will the unexpected but powerful role of tribal fi shing rights do to future allocations? What effect will the realization that those federal reserved water rights implicit in tribal treaty records established water rights prior to nearly all established and current water uses have on future allocations? Add to the mix the newly evolved value of in-stream fl ow, which necessitates leaving some water in the stream rather than allocating every drop of a river, and the picture changes again (Rodgers 1993; Ellis 1996; Neuman 1998; Ortolono 2000 Ortolono , 2002 .
Other unanticipated consequences relate to cost overruns, increased farm size, improvements in agricultural technology, changes in social values for the use of water, and evolution of environmental regulations, as well as ambiguity in measuring indirect costs and benefi ts. Macinko discussed problems that arose with the CBP as agricultural technology rapidly changed with advancements such as the tractor or weed harrow, which made small-sized farm plots less economically competitive than larger-sized plots. He notes that the inability of planners to adapt as conditions changed institutionalized many management decisions, even as their utility became obsolete (Macinko 1975) . Similarly, cost overruns and a lack of clearly calculated costs and benefi ts show that political and ideological choices outweighed the economic considerations from the beginning (Shepherd 2002) .
Changing social values become apparent as reclamation, the most discussed "benefi t" arising from original plans for the CBP, is supplanted fi rst by employment, then by regional development, then by hydropower, and fi nally by agriculture (Shepherd 2002) . Common wisdom held that water utilized for irrigation generated a productive and valuable water use, especially in the arid West. Ways by which the water was captured, stored, diverted, distributed, and consumed, and by which any excess water was disposed of, remained in the sphere of engineering and technical discussions; the fact of water use shunted to irrigation did not raise questions. Th is is no longer the case, as more-effi cient competitors vie for the fi nite water of the Columbia River Basin.
Conclusions
Th is review of literature spans several decades and many directions of thought in the hope to provide a cohesive look at how scholars understand and examine this behemoth reclamation project along the Columbia River. Some interesting trends and gaps emerge when the literature is accumulated. First, two basic periods of scholarly interest appear, just aft er the fi rst round of development in the CBP and then again in the 1990s, with a noticeably large gap of literature in the intervening decades. From a thematic perspective, only the legal literature shows sustained and nuanced interest in the CBP, as the legal and policy implications elude clarity. As the perceived success of the CBP ebbed and fl owed with the decades in the views of other scholars, within the legal literature the project continually recurred as a case study exemplar of dysfunction in the legal system. Several questions remain unanswered aft er reviewing this literature, and some pertinent questions remain unasked. For instance, insuffi cient numbers exist to compare the total cost of the irrigation water with the prices that individual farmers pay for their water. Th us, a true accounting of agricultural subsidization that accounts for water subsidies has not yet occurred. Also, there is no discussion in the literature of any alternative considerations to the CBP; if not this project, then what manifestation of development, or lack thereof, is a plausible alternative scenario for the Columbia River Basin? We now have an entire infrastructure of irrigation canals, dams, and reservoirs, but that infrastructure is aging. Will pragmatic safety and repair problems force a reconsideration of issues long ignored? Th e newest trend in river management-removal of dams-began due to safety concerns, as the dams themselves age and become unstable. Th is pragmatic response set off politically charged debates in which a reconsideration of the need for many dams, and the trade-off s made for their existence, is ongoing.
With costs for the CBP construction and infrastructure jumping from 1940 estimates of $487,000,000 to 1964 estimates of $970,000,000, this dampened enthusiasm for completion of the half-fi nished project (Shepherd 2002) . However, it remains unclear to what extent fi scal constraints, a dubious return on the investment dollar, or unevenly distributed benefi ts of the project infl uenced decision makers regarding the desire to complete the project, or not. Much of the literature suggests that while all these problems exist, they have not deterred the continuing myth of irrigation as a "valueadded" investment in natural systems that are insuffi cient in their original state. Th us, underlying philosophic dilemmas have not yet been addressed concerning sustainable water uses. Within the calculus of supply and demand, there is no discussion of decreasing demand, only increasing supply for irrigation and other consumptive uses.
Th is review is not merely a meditation on ideal conditions versus real constraints; it is our fervent hope that these unanswered questions will not remain unanswered. A thorough understanding of the costs/benefi ts, motivations, and consequences of this project must be considered, and soon. Current interest in the CBP has reawakened in large part because of groundwater overconsumption. Agricultural operations within the boundary of the original CBP, but outside the developed infrastructure for receiving surface water off the Columbia River, have pumped groundwater from the Odessa aquifer for several decades to irrigate crops. Th at aquifer now appears substantially depleted, and is dropping a dozen feet each year. Th e current plan to remedy this problem, as promoted by the Bureau and Washington State's governor, is to extend the current size of the CBP from 670,000 acres to its original 1. What long-term consequences will accrue as the CBP continues to provide water at substantially subsidized prices, far below market cost, to farmers in the region? Th e most fundamental unaddressed issue is whether the short-term gain made by subsidizing irrigation farmers in a desert region, via an infrastructure that harnesses a waterway to the exclusion of other uses, outweighs the long-term consequences. Seventy-fi ve years aft er the fact of its existence, remarkably few people spend eff ort, energy, or scholarship seriously assessing the full implications of the largest reclamation project in America, even as politicians and federal agencies gather to discuss expanding the Columbia Basin Project.
